

# Medical Malpractice and Multiple Health Professionals: How to Control Opportunism

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## Abstract

The development of advanced nursing practice helps to meet many challenges of the French health system. This development, which leads two health professionals to treat a patient together, raises a question of effort control. We model the second-line nursing practice through a sequential game where the physician and the APN make substitutable efforts. Both professionals deliver a credence good and they may be opportunistic. With contractible effort levels, we find that a payment-for-performance policy is efficient to control moral hazard. With non-contractible effort levels, negligence rule is required. This dual mechanism implies perfect deterrence, regardless of the physician's ability to anticipate the nursing effort. However, it also implies overcompensation. If in addition the nurse is employed by the physician and if the physician can penalize her, we show that the patient is just compensated for harm.

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